

Continuous Proactive Security with OSCAL

Going Beyond 'Shifting Left Security'

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
Agenda

- ☐ Why NIST started OSCAL
- ☐ What is OSCAL
 - ☐ Released Models
 - ☐ Prototype Models
- ☐ Proactive security with OSCAL




The Problem ...





The Solution ...

A (Cyber) Machine-readable Esperanto that enables actors, tools and organizations to exchange information via automation:



5

The Implementation ...



Open Security Controls Assessment Language

OSCAL: is a standardized, flexible, opensource language that expresses security controls and their associated implementations and assessment methods in both, machine-readable and human formats.

Design Goals ...

- Improve the efficiency, timeliness, accuracy, and consistency of system security assessments
- □ Enable traceability of design, implementation, and assessment back to the original control statements
- ☐ Set the foundation for automation and interoperability

- Open
- □ Security
- Controls
- □ Assessment
- ☐ Language

- ☐ Free for everyone
- ☐ Compliance (security, privacy, safety, etc...)
- ☐ Requirements that needs assessment
- Evaluation of the safeguard implemented in response of a set of requirements
- □ Digital representation a translation of the information for machines to consume.

Applicable to Any Domain ...

	REQUIREMENTS	IMPLEMENTATION	EVALUATION	MONITORING
	OSCAL CONTROL LAYER	OSCAL IMPLEMENTATION LAYER	OSCAL ASSES	SMENT LAYER
SECURITY	(NIST 800-53; CSF; CC	OBIT5; CIS; CSA CCM, A	CSA ISM; ISO/IEC 270	01,2,17; etc.)
HEALTHCA	ARE (HIPAA; Equipment	Specifications, etc.)		
FINANCIAI	(PCI DSS, SOC2 Type	1 & Type2; DORA; KYC;	AML; PSD2; etc.)	
PRIVACY (Privacy Act of 1974; GDPR; COPPA; State Privacy Laws; etc.)				
SAFETY (Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Regulations)				

Revision History, Prepared By/For

Parameter

Parameter Definitions (Global)

Control

Parameter Definitions (by Control)

Control Requirement Definitions

Control Objectives

Assessment Methods

Group (Family)

Grouping of Parameters

Grouping of Controls

Back Matter

Laws/Regulations,

Other Attachments

January 29, 2021 -- OSCAL Version 1.0.0-RC-1

The **import** arrow identifies

what OSCAL content is linked as a result

the import statement. Imported content referenced, not copied.

Profile (Control Baseline)

import

import

import

Title, Version, Date, Document Labels Revision History, Prepared By/For

Import (Catalog or Profile)

Import (Catalog or Profile)

URI pointing to a Catalog or Profile

Controls to Include Controls to Exclude

Merge

Conflict Directives Profile Resolution Grouping Directives

Modify

Parameter Modifications Control Requirement Modifications Control Objective Modifications Assessment Method Modifications

Back Matter

Laws/Regulations, Standards/Guidance

import

Title. Version. Date. Document Labels Roles, People, Teams, Locations

System Security Plan (SSP)

Metadata

Import Profile

URI pointing to a Profile

System Characteristics

System ID, Name, Description Sensitivity/Impact Level System Information Service & Deployment Models Diagrams: Authorization Boundary. Network, Data Flow

System Implementation

Users, Components, Inventory Ports, Protocols, & Services Interconnections

Control Implementation

Responsible Parties, Status, Origination Parameter Values, Implementation Description, Inheritance, Consumer Responsibilities

Back Matter

Laws/Regulations, Standards/Guidance Citations and External Links Attachments and Embedded Images

Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M)

Revision History, Prepared By/For Roles, People, Teams, Locations

Import SSP

URI pointing to an OSCAL SSP

System Identifier

Unique system ID - used when the SSP is not delivered with the POA&M

Local Definitions

For content not defined in the SSP

Observation

Individual observations and evidence, impacted assets

Enumerates, characterizes, identifies deviations, and provides status for identified risks

POA&M Items

POA&M ID. Impacted Controls. Weakness Details

Back Matter

Attachments and Embedded Images

Assessment Plan (AP)

Title, Version, Date, Document Labels, Revision History, Prepared By/For Roles, People, Teams, Locations

import

Import SSP URI pointing to an SSP

Local Definitions

When information in the linked SSP is missing or inaccurate, assessors may define it here

Terms and Conditions

Rules of Engagement, Disclosures, Limitation of Liability, Assumption Statements, and Methodology

Reviewed Controls

Controls to include in the assessment we well as associated Control Objectives and Assessment Methods

Assessment Subject

Identifies what will be assessed, including: Components, Inventory Items, Locations, and User Types, as well as Parties to be Interviewed

Assessment Assets

Tools used to perform the assessment

Assessment Action

Enumerates the actions for performing the assessment, including procedures for performing the assessment action

Intended schedule of milestones and assessment actions

Laws/Regulations, Standards/Guidance May include artifacts to review Other Attachments as Needed

ASSESSMENT PLAN MODEL

Assessment Results (AR)

impo

Metadata Title, Version, Date, Document Labels Revision History, Prepared By/For Roles, People, Teams, Locations

Import AF URI pointing to an Assessment Plan

Local Definitions (Overarching) When results contain an activity or control objective not defined by the assessment plan, define it here

Result (Current)

Local Definitions

When information in the linked AP or SSP is missing or inaccurate, assessors may define

Reviewed Controls

Controls included in the assessment

Assessment Subject

ld entifies what was assessed, including: Components, Inventory Items, Locations, and User Types, as well as Parties to be interviewed

Assessment Assets

Tools used to perform the assessment

Attestation

Assertions made by the assesso

Assessment Log Log of performed assessment actions

Observation Individual observations and evidence

Enumerates and characterizes risks and

weaknesses, pro vid es risk status

Finding

ld entified findings, Objective

Results (Last Cycle)

Results (Earlier Cycle)

Laws/Regulations, Standards/Guidance

Evidence Attachments: Reviewed Artifacts, Interview Notes, Screen Shots, Photos, Tool Reports, Raw Output Penetration Test Report

ASSESSMENT RESULTS MODEL

OSCAL v1.1.3 Models

Component Definition

Component Definition

Component Definition

Import Component Definition

URI pointing to other component definition files

Component

Individual component information, and

information about controls the component is able to satisfy

Capability

A grouping of related components into

Back Matter Citations and External Links Attachments and Embedded Imag

a larger capability





OSCAL: the Open Security Controls Assessment Language







Providing control-related information in machine-readable formats.

NIST, in collaboration with industry, is developing the Open Security Controls Assessment Language (OSCAL). OSCAL is a set of formats expressed in XML, JSON, and YAML. These formats provide machine-readable representations of control catalogs, control baselines, system security plans, and assessment plans and results.

OSCAL Models' Outline










OSCAL Models' References



OSCAL Releases



FIRST OSCAL 1.0.0

RELEASED ON JUNE 7, 2021

LATEST: OSCAL 1.1.3





https://github.com/usnistgov/OSCAL/re leases

"...First official, major release of OSCAL provides a stable OSCAL 1.0.0 for widescale implementation ..."

Latest OSCAL patch release: 1.1.3 - backwards compatible.


OSCAL Ecosystem







OSCAL Controls Layer



OSCAL Catalog Model

Represents a collection of security and privacy controls, which may be used as part of a risk management program.

- Metadata: Same for each OSCAL model
- > Parameter: Provides a global policy variable used by one or more control
- Control: An individual control in the catalog.
 - May contain control-specific parameters, control requirement statements, control objectives, assessment methods, references
 - Controls can have child controls.
- Group: Related controls may be grouped. Parameters related to this group may be defined here.
- > Back Matter: Same for each OSCAL model

Catalog

Metadata
Title, Version, Date, Document Labels,
Revision History, Prepared By/For

Parameter

Parameter Definitions (Global)

Control

Parameter Definitions (by Control)
Control Requirement Definitions
Control Objectives
Assessment Methods

Group (Family)

Grouping of Parameters
Grouping of Controls

Back Matter

Laws/Regulations,
Standards/Guidance
Citations and External Links
Other Attachments

OSCAL Catalog Model

Catalog

MetadataTitle, Version, Date, Document Labels,
Revision History, Prepared By/For

Parameter

Parameter Definitions (Global)

Control

Parameter Definitions (by Control)
Control Requirement Definitions
Control Objectives
Assessment Methods

Group (Family)

Grouping of Parameters
Grouping of Controls

Back Matter

Laws/Regulations, Standards/Guidance Citations and External Links Other Attachments

```
▼ <catalog uuid="uuid"> [1]
   ▶ <metadata> ... </metadata> [1]
   ▶ <param id="token" class="token" depends-on="token"> ... </param> [0 to ∞]
   ▼ <control id="token" class="token"> [0 to ∞]
       ▶ <title>markup-line</title> [1]
       ▶ <param id="token" class="token" depends-on="token"> ... </param> [0 to ∞]
       ... </prop> [0 to ∞]
       ▶ link href="uri-reference" rel="token" media-type="string" resource-
         fragment="string"> ... </link> [0 to ∞]
       ▶ <part id="token" name="token" ns="uri" class="token"> ... </part> [0 to ∞]
         <control> (recursive: model like parent control) </control> [0 to ∞]
     </control>
   ▼ <group id="token" class="token"> [0 to ∞]
       ▶ <title>markup-line</title> [1]
       ▶ <param id="token" class="token" depends-on="token"> ... </param> [0 to ∞]
       ▶ 
▶ 
prop name="token" uuid="uuid" ns="uri" value="string" class="token" group="token">

         ... </prop> [0 to ∞]
       ▶ link href="uri-reference" rel="token" media-type="string" resource-
         fragment="string"> ... </link> [0 to ∞]
       ▶ <part id="token" name="token" ns="uri" class="token"> ... </part> [0 to ∞]
         A choice of:
            <group> (recursive: model like ancestor group) </group> [0 to ∞]
          ▶ <control id="token" class="token"> ... </control> [0 to ∞]
     </group>
   ▶ <back-matter> ... </back-matter> [0 or 1]
 </catalog>
```

OSCAL Profile Model

Used to establish a baseline of controls to be implemented with a system.

- Metadata: Same for each OSCAL model
- Import: Identifies an OSCAL catalog or other profile to import controls from
 - A control must be imported to be included in a baseline.
 - All parameters and back-matter resources cited by an imported control are also imported.
- Merge: Provides directives used to organize controls and to resolve conflicts when the same control is imported multiple times
- ➤ **Modify:** Allows tailoring of imported controls, including their parameters, control requirement definitions, references, control objectives, and assessment actions.
- Back Matter: Same for each OSCAL model

Profile (Control Baseline) Metadata Title, Version, Date, Document Labels, Revision History, Prepared By/For Import (Catalog or Profile) Import (Catalog or Profile) Import URI pointing to a Catalog or Profile Controls to Include Controls to Exclude Merge **Conflict Directives Profile Resolution Grouping Directives** Modify **Parameter Modifications** Control Requirement Modifications **Control Objective Modifications** Assessment Method Modifications **Back Matter**

Laws/Regulations, Standards/Guidance Citations and External Links

Other Attachments as Needed

OSCAL Profile Model

Profile (Control Baseline)

Metadata

Title, Version, Date, Document Labels, Revision History, Prepared By/For

Import (Catalog or Profile)

Import (Catalog or Profile)

Import

URI pointing to a Catalog or Profile

Controls to Include Controls to Exclude

Merge

Conflict Directives
Profile Resolution Grouping Directives

Modify

Parameter Modifications
Control Requirement Modifications
Control Objective Modifications
Assessment Method Modifications

Back Matter

Laws/Regulations,
Standards/Guidance
Citations and External Links
Other Attachments as Needed


```
▼ <profile uuid="uuid"> [1]
   ▶ <metadata> ... </metadata> [1]
   ▼<import href="uri-reference"> [1 to ∞]
         A choice of:
           ▶ <include-all/> [1]
           ▶ <include-controls with-child-controls="token"> ... </include-controls> [1 to ∞]
        ▶ <exclude-controls with-child-controls="token"> ... </exclude-controls> [0 to ∞]
     </import>
   ▼ <merge> [0 or 1]
        ▶ <combine method="string"/> [0 or 1]
         A choice of:
           ▶ <flat/> [1]
           ▶ <as-is>boolean</as-is> [1]
           ▶ <custom> ... </custom> [1]
     </merge>
   ▼ <modify> [0 or 1]
        ▶ <set-parameter param-id="token" class="token" depends-on="token"> ... </set-parameter>
         [0 to ∞]
        ▶ <alter control-id="token"> ... </alter> [0 to ∞]
     </modify>
   ▶ <back-matter> ... </back-matter> [0 or 1]
 </profile>
```

OSCAL Profile Model - Native Traceability

A profile can import controls from:

- > A catalog or multiple catalogs
- Another profile or multiple profiles

This allows a baseline to be established by customizing another baseline.



EXAMPLE: A 27002 CONTROL (PROSE)

6.1.2 Segregation of duties

Control

Conflicting duties and areas of responsibility should be segregated to reduce opportunities for unauthorized or unintentional modification or misuse of the organization's assets.

Implementation guidance

Care should be taken that no single person can access, modify or use assets without authorization or detection. The initiation of an event should be separated from its authorization. The possibility of collusion should be considered in designing the controls. Small organizations may find segregation of duties difficult to achieve, but the principle should be

applied as far as is possible and practicable. Whenever it is difficult to segregate, other controls such as monitoring of activities, audit trails and management supervision should be considered.

Other information

Segregation of duties is a method for reducing the risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of an organization's assets.

EXAMPLE OSCAL XML CATALOG:

```
</control>
   <control class="ssc-iso-sc27" id="s6.1.2">
    <title>Segregation of duties</title>
    prop name="label">6.1.2</prop>
    prop name="sort-id">c02</prop>
    <part id="s6.1.2 stm" name="statement">
     cprop name="label">Control</prop>
      Conflicting duties and areas of responsibility should be segregated to reduce
          opportunities for unauthorized or unintentional modification or misuse of the
          organization's assets.
    </part>
    <part id="s6.1.2 gdn" name="guidance">
     prop name="label">Implementation guidance
     <part id="s6.1.2 gdn.1" name="guidance">
      Care should be taken that no single person can access, modify or use assets
           without authorization or detection. The initiation of an event should be
           separated from its authorization. The possibility of collusion should be
           considered in designing the controls.
     </part>
     <part id="s6.1.2 gdn.2" name="guidance">
      Small organizations may find segregation of duties difficult to
          achieve, but the principle should be applied as far as is possible and
          practicable. Whenever it is difficult to segregate, other controls such
          as monitoring of activities, audit trails and management supervision
          should be considered.
     </part>
    </part>
    <part id="s6.1.2 inf" name="information">
     prop name="label">Other information
     Segregation of duties is a method for reducing the risk of accidental
         or deliberate misuse of an organization's assets.
    </part>
</control>
```

EXAMPLE OSCAL JSON CATALOG:

```
"id" : "s6.1.2",
"title" : "Segregation of duties",
"properties" : [ {
"name" : "label",
"value" : "6.1.2"
} ],
"parts" : [ {
   "id" : "s6.1.2 stm",
   "name" : "statement",
   "title" : "Control".
   "prose" : "Conflicting duties and areas of responsibility should be\n
    segregated to reduce opportunities for unauthorized or unintentional\n
    modification or misuse of the organization's assets."
  }, {
   "id" : "s6.1.2 gdn",
   "name" : "guidance",
   "title" : "Implementation Guidance"
   "parts" : [ {
       "id" : "s6.1.2_gdn.1",
       "name" : "item",
       "prose": "Care should be taken that no single person can access,\n
              modify or use assets without authorization or detection. \n
             The initiation of an event should be separated from its\n
              authorization. The possibility of collusion should be\n
              considered in designing the controls."
       }, {
       "id" : "s6.1.2 gdn.2",
       "name" : "item",
       "prose": "Small organizations may find segregation of duties\n
              difficult to achieve, but the principle should be applied\n
              as far as is possible and practicable. Whenever it is\n
              difficult to segregate, other controls such as monitoring\n
              of activities, audit trails and management supervision\n
              should be considered."
       } 1
  }, {
    "id" : "s6.1.2 inf",
    "name" : "information".
    "title" : "Other Information"
    "prose" : "Segregation of duties is a method for reducing the risk\n
              of accidental or deliberate misuse of an organization's\n
               assets."
} ]
```

EXAMPLE OSCAL YAML CATALOG:

```
- id: s6.1.2
       title: Segregation of duties
        properties:
        - name: label
          value: 6.1.2
        parts:
        - id: s6.1.2 stm
          name: statement
          title: Control
         prose: |-
           Conflicting duties and areas of responsibility should be segregated
           to reduce opportunities for unauthorized or unintentional
           modification or misuse of the organization's assets.
        - id: s1.1.2 gdn
         name: guidance
         title: Implementation guidance
          parts:
          - id: s1.1.2 gdn.1
           name: item
           prose: -
             Care should be taken that no single person can access, modify or
             use assets without authorization or detection. The initiation of an
             event should be separated from its authorization. The possibility
             of collusion should be considered in designing the controls.
          - id: s1.1.2 gdn.2
            name: item
           prose: -
             Small organizations may find segregation of duties difficult to
             achieve, but the principle should be applied as far as is possible
             and practicable. Whenever it is difficult to segregate, other
             controls such as monitoring of activities, audit trails and
             management supervision should be considered.
        - id: s1.1.2 inf
          name: information
         title: Other information
         prose: -
           Segregation of duties is a method for reducing the risk of accidental
or deliberate misuse of an organization's assets.
```

Translate 27002 in OSCAL XML

ENGLISH

```
</control>
   <control class="ssc-iso-sc27" id="s6.1.2">
    <title>Segregation of duties</title>
    prop name="label">6.1.2</prop>
    prop name="sort-id">c02</prop>
    <part id="s6.1.2 stm" name="statement">
     cprop name="label">Control</prop>
      Conflicting duties and areas of responsibility should be segregated to reduce
          opportunities for unauthorized or unintentional modification or misuse of the
          organization's assets.
    </part>
    <part id="s6.1.2 gdn" name="guidance">
     prop name="label">Implementation guidance
     <part id="s6.1.2 gdn.1" name="guidance">
      Care should be taken that no single person can access, modify or use assets
          without authorization or detection. The initiation of an event should be
          separated from its authorization. The possibility of collusion should be
          considered in designing the controls.
     </part>
     <part id="s6.1.2 gdn.2" name="guidance">
      Small organizations may find segregation of duties difficult to
         achieve, but the principle should be applied as far as is possible and
         practicable. Whenever it is difficult to segregate, other controls such
         as monitoring of activities, audit trails and management supervision
         should be considered.
     </part>
    </part>
    <part id="s6.1.2 inf" name="information">
    prop name="label">Other information</prop>
     Segregation of duties is a method for reducing the risk of accidental
         or deliberate misuse of an organization's assets.
    </part>
</control>
```

FRENCH


```
</control>
  <control class="ssc-iso-sc27" id="s6.1.2">
   <title> Séparation des tâches</title>
   prop name="label">6.1.2</prop>
   prop name="sort-id">c02</prop>
   <part id="s6.1.2 stm" name="statement">
     prop name="label"> Mesure</prop>
     Il convient de séparer les tâches et les domaines de responsabilité incompatibles pour
         limiter les possibilités de modification ou de mauvais usage, non autorisé(e) ou
          involontaire, des actifs de l'organisation.
   </part>
   <part id="s6.1.2 gdn" name="guidance">
    prop name="label">Préconisations de mise en oeuvre
    <part id="s6.1.2 gdn.1" name="guidance">
      Il convient de veiller à ce que personne ne puisse accéder à, modifier ou utiliser des actifs
          sans en avoir reçu l'autorisation ou sans avoir été détecté. Il convient de séparer le
          déclenchement d'un événement de son autorisation. Il convient d'envisager la possibilité
          de collusion lors de la conception des mesures.
     </part>
    <part id="s6.1.2 gdn.2" name="guidance">
      Les organisations de petite taille peuvent avoir des difficultés à réaliser une séparation
          des tâches, mais il convient d'appliquer ce principe dans la mesure du possible. Lorsqu'il
          est difficile de procéder à la séparation des tâches, il convient d'envisager d'autres
          mesures comme la surveillance des activités, des systèmes de traçabilité et la supervision
          de la direction.
     </part>
   </part>
   <part id="s6.1.2 inf" name="information">
    prop name="label">Informations supplémentaires
     La séparation des tâches est une méthode permettant de diminuer les risques de mauvais
         usage, accidentel ou délibéré, des actifs d'une organisation. 
   </part>
</control>
```

OSCAL & Translations of 27002

- □OSCAL minimizes the discrepancies between translated versions.
 - ➤ "Other information" and "Informations supplémentaires" will have the same tag
- □OSCAL can support automatic translation of the standard (e.g dedicated tool).

Shifting Left with OSCAL Implementation Layer

- Component Definition Model
- ☐ System Security Plan (SSP) Model




The Component Definition ...

https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/reference/latest/component-definition/

Defines how the component or capability supports a set of controls.

```
▼ component-definition [1]: {
    uuid [1]: uuid,
    ▶ metadata [1]: { ... },
    ▶ import-component-definitions [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
    ▶ components [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
    ▶ capabilities [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
    ▶ back-matter [0 or 1]: { ... },
}
```



The Component Definition

https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/reference/latest/component-definition/

```
▼ control-implementations [0 or 1]
    An array of control-implementation objects [1 to ∞] {
        uuid [1]: uuid,
        source [1]: uri-reference,
        description [1]: markup-multiline,
        ▶ props [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
        ▶ links [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
        ▶ set-parameters [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
        ▼ implemented-requirements [1]: [
             An array of implemented-requirement objects [1 to ∞]
                 uuid [1]: uuid,
                 control-id [1]: token,
                 description [1]: markup-multiline,
                 ▶ props [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                 ▶ links [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                 ▶ set-parameters [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                 ▶ responsible-roles [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                 ▶ statements [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                 remarks [0 or 1]: markup-multiline,
```

Component Definition

Metadata on Date Document La

Title, Version, Date, Document Labels, Revision History, Prepared By

Import Component Definition

URI pointing to other component definition files

Component

Individual component information, and information about controls the component is able to satisfy

Capability

A grouping of related components into a larger capability

Back Matter

Citations and External Links
Attachments and Embedded Images

Cybersecurity 'Shipping Container*'



OSCAL Component Definition (Cdef) instances are like the maritime shipping containers!

OSCAL Component Definition Model allows:

- Vendors to document the security controls implemented by their products
- System owners or policy makers to define 'playbooks' for system components
- System owners to test, review and provisionally authorize system components
- ☐ Reuse the components for different systems
- ☐ Ease the system's documentation generation
- ☐ Human-intensive labor of generating SSP to be semi-automated

The SSP Model

https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/reference/latest/system-security-plan/json-outline/

System Security Plan (SSP)

ivietadat

Title, Version, Date, Document Labels, Revision History, Prepared By/For Roles, People, Teams, Locations

Import Profile

URI pointing to a Profile

System Characteristics

System ID, Name, Description
Sensitivity/Impact Level
System Information
Service & Deployment Models
Diagrams: Authorization Boundary,
Network, Data Flow

System Implementation

Users, Components, Inventory Ports, Protocols, & Services Interconnections

Control Implementation

Responsible Parties, Status, Origination Parameter Values, Implementation Description, Inheritance, Consumer Responsibilities


Back Matter


Laws/Regulations, Standards/Guidance Citations and External Links Attachments and Embedded Images


The SSP Model ...

https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/reference/latest/system-security-plan/json-outline/

```
▼ system-security-plan [1]: {
    uuid [1]: uuid,
    ▶ metadata [1]: { ... }.
    ▶ import-profile [1]: { ... },
    ▶ system-characteristics [1]: { ... },
    ▼ control-implementation [1]: {
        description [1]: markup-multiline,
        ▶ set-parameters [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
        ▼ implemented-requirements [1]: [
            An array of implemented-requirement objects [1 to ∞]
                 uuid [1]: uuid,
                 control-id [1]: token.
                 ▶ props [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                 ▶ links [0 or 1]: [ ... ].
                 ▶ set-parameters [0 or 1]: [ ... ].
                 ▶ responsible-roles [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                 ▶ statements [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                 ▼by-components [0 or 1]: [
                     An array of by-component objects [1 to ∞] {
                          component-uuid [1]: uuid,
                          uuid [1]: uuid,
                          description [1]: markup-multiline,
                         ▶ props [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                         ▶ links [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                         ▶ set-parameters [0 or 1]: [ ... ].
                         ▶ implementation-status [0 or 1]: { ... },
                         ▶ export [0 or 1]: { ... },
                         ▶ inherited [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                         ▶ satisfied [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                         ▶ responsible-roles [0 or 1]: [ ... ],
                          remarks [0 or 1]: markup-multiline.
                 remarks [0 or 1]: markup-multiline,
    ▶ back-matter [0 or 1]: { ... }
```







Even Container Ships Can Sink



'Shifting left' the security by pre-assessing the system's components does not mean the system is secure by default!

- Review the components in the context of the respective system
- Review the interaction between components
- Get the max return in your investment – be granular with the data and the assessment

Assessment Plan (AP) & Assessment Results (AR)

- Overlapping syntax
- ☐ Similar but distinct purposes
- ☐ Unique to AR: Results and

Evidence

Continuous Assessment Approach

- ☐ Assessment Plan:
 - What should be tested/inspected, how, and with which frequency
- **☐** Assessment Results:
 - □ Time-slice of results

Assessment Plan (AP) Title, Version, Date, Document Labels Revision History, Prepared By/For Roles, People, Teams, Locations Import SSP URI pointing to an SSP Local Definitions When information in the linked SSP is missing or inaccurate, assessors may define it here Terms and Conditions Rules of Engagement, Disclosures, Limitation of Liability, Assumption Statements, and Methodology Reviewed Controls Controls to include in the assessment we well as associated Control Objectives and Assessment Methods **Assessment Subject** Identifies what will be assessed, including: Components, Inventory Items, Locations, and User Types, as well as Parties to be Interviewed **Assessment Assets** Tools used to perform the assessment Assessment Action Enumerates the actions for performing the assessment, including procedures for performing the assessment action Task Intended schedule of milestones and assessment actions **Back Matter** Laws/Regulations, Standards/Guidance May include artifacts to review Other Attachments as Needed

Metadata Title, Version, Date, Document Labels, Revision History, Prepared By/For Roles, People, Teams, Locations Import AP URI pointing to an Assessment Plan Local Definitions (Overarching) When results contain an activity or control objective not defined by the assessment plan, define it here Result (Current) **Local Definitions** When information in the linked AP or SSP is missing or inaccurate, assessors may define it here **Reviewed Controls** Controls included in the assessment Assessment Subject Identifies what was assessed, including: Components, Inventory Items, Locations, and User Types, as well as Parties to be interviewed Assessment Assets Tools used to perform the assessment Attest ation Assertions made by the Assessment Log Log of performed assessment actions Observation Individual observations and evidence Risk Enumerates and characterizes risks and weaknesses, provides risk status Finding Identified findings, Objective Status Results (Last Cycle) Results (Earlier Cycle) **Back Matter** Laws/Regulations, Evidence Attachments: Reviewed Artifacts, Interview Notes, Screen Shots, Photos, Tool Reports,

Penetration Test Report

Other Attachments as Needed

Assessment Results (AR)

Results (Last Cycle)

Findings / Observations Identified Risks, Calculations Deviations Recommendations Remediation Plans Evidence Descriptions and Links Disposition Status

Results (Initial Cycle)

Findings / Observations Identified Risks, Calculations Deviations Recommendations Remediation Plans Evidence Descriptions and Links Disposition Status

OSCAL POA&M Model

System Security Plan (SSP) Metadata role, party (person/org/team) **Import Profile System Characteristics System Implementation** Leveraged Authorization User Component [This System] * **Component (Access Control Process)** Component (Linux OS) **System Inventory Inventory Item Control Implementation** Implemented Requirement (AC-1) Implemented Requirement (AC-2) Implemented Requirement (AC-3) **Back Matter** Attachments and Citations

Assessment Results (AR)

Import Assessment Plan

Local Definitions

Results (Current)

Local Definitions

Reviewed Controls

Assessment Subject


Assessment Assets


Attestations / Assessment Log Findings / Observations

Identified Risks, Calculations Deviations
Recommendations and Remediation Plans
Evidence Descriptions and Links
Disposition Status


Results (Last Cycle)

Results (Earlier Cycle)





The Shared Responsibility (SR) Model




Leveraging System:

- The leveraging system's SSP should:
 - identify what is inherited from a leveraged system
 - identify any addressed responsibilities (as identified by the leveraged system)

In addition to:

- identifying what may be inherited by the leveraging system's customers
- any responsibilities the leveraging system's customers must address to fully satisfy a control

Multi-layer SRMs ...



The same syntax is used

It is simply replicated for each leveraged system

The Leveraging System's SSP:

- Has a separate "leveragedauthorization" assembly for each leveraged system.
- Has a separate "component" representing each leveraged system.
- Has a separate "component" representing the leveraged system components associated with inherited capabilities.

The Prototype Shared Responsibility Model

- Outline -

```
<implemented-requirement uuid="uuid" control-</pre>
id="token"> [1 to ∞]
  by="uuid" exportable="boolean"> ...
                                                  rop name="token" uuid="uuid" ns="uri"
  vided> [0 to ∞]
                                                    value="string" class="token" group="token"> ...
<responsibility uuid="uuid" provided-</p>
                                                    > [0 to ∞]
  uuid="uuid" exportable="boolean"> ...
                                                  ▶ link href="uri-reference" rel="token" media-
  </responsibility> [0 to ∞]
                                                    type="string" resource-fragment="string"> ...
<inherited uuid="uuid" provided-</p>
                                                    </link> [0 to ∞]
  uuid="uuid" implemented-by="uuid"
                                                  ▶ <set-parameter param-id="token"> ... </set-
  exportable="boolean"> ... </inherited>
                                                    parameter> [0 to ∞]
   [0 to ∞]
                                                  <responsible-role role-id="token"> ...
<satisfied uuid="uuid" responsibility-</p>
                                                    </responsible-role> [0 to ∞]
  uuid="uuid" inherited-uuid="uuid"
                                                  ▶ <statement statement-id="token" uuid="uuid"> ...
  exportable="boolean"> ... </satisfied>
                                                    </statement> [0 to ∞]
  [0 to ∞]
                                                 <by-component component-uuid="uuid"</p>
                                                    uuid="uuid"> ... </by-component> [0 to ∞]
<responsible-role role-id="token"> ...
                                                  ▶ <remarks>markup-multiline</remarks> [0 or 1]
  </responsible-role> [0 to ∞]
                                                 </implemented-requirement>
```


```
▼ <shared-responsibility uuid="uuid"> [1]
   ▶ <metadata> ... </metadata> [1]
   ▼ <source-ssp ssp-uuid="uuid"> [0 or 1]
        ▶ <title>markup-line</title> [0 or 1]
        ▶ <published>date-time-with-timezone</published> [0]
        ▶ <last-modified>date-time-with-timezone</last-
          modified> [0 or 1]
        ► <version>string</version> [0 or 1]
        ▶ <date-authorized>date</date-authorized> [0 or 1]
        > <party-uuid>uuid</party-uuid> [1]
        ▶ <referenced-profile href="uri-reference"/> [0 or 1]
        > rop name="token" uuid="uuid" ns="uri"
          value="string" class="token" group="token"> ...
          > [0 to ∞]
        ▶ k href="uri-reference" rel="token" media-
          type="string" resource-fragment="string"> ... </link>
          [0 to ∞]
        ▶ <remarks>markup-multiline</remarks> [0 or 1]
     </source-ssp>
    ▼ <control-implementation> [1]
        ▶ <description>markup-multiline</description> [1]
        <set-parameter param-id="token"> ... </set-parameter>
          [0 to ∞]
       ▶ <implemented-requirement uuid="uuid" control-
          id="token"> ... </implemented-requirement> [1 to ∞]
     </control-implementation>
   ▶ <back-matter> ... </back-matter> [0 or 1]
 </shared-responsibility>
```

The Prototype Control Mapping Model

- Outline -

```
▼ <mapping-collection uuid="uuid"> [1]
   ▶ <metadata> ... </metadata> [1]
   ... </provenance> [1]
   ▼ <mapping uuid="uuid"> [1 to ∞]
       <source-resource type="token" href="uri-reference"> ... </source-</p>
         resource> [1]
       ▶ <target-resource type="token" href="uri-reference"> ... </target-
         resource> [1]
       ▼ <map uuid="uuid" ns="uri" matching-rationale="string"> [1 to ∞]
           ▶ <relationship>token</relationship> [1]
           ▶ <source type="token" id-ref="string"> ... </source> [1 to ∞]
           ▶ <target type="token" id-ref="string"> ... </target> [1 to ∞]
           <qualifier subject="string" predicate="string"</pre>
            category="string"> ... </qualifier> [0 to ∞]
           class="token" group="token"> ... </prop> [0 to ∞]
           k href="uri-reference" rel="token" media-type="string"
             resource-fragment="string"> ... </link> [0 to ∞]
           <remarks>markup-multiline</remarks> [0 or 1]
         </map>
     </mapping>
   <source-gap-summary uuid="uuid"> ... </source-gap-summary> [0 or 1]
   <target-gap-summary uuid="uuid"> ... </target-gap-summary> [0 or 1]
   ▶ <back-matter> ... </back-matter> [0 or 1]
 </mapping-collection>
```

OSCAL Models & RMF



PREPARE CATEGORIZE

SELECT


IMPLEMENT

ASSESS

AUTHORIZE

CON-MON 40





The future of OSCAL ...

```
mirror_mod.use_x = True
  reraction == "MIRROR_X":
mirror_mod.use_y = False
"Irror_mod.use_z = False
 operation == "MIRROR_Y"
 Irror_mod.use_x = False
 irror_mod.use_y = True
 irror_mod.use_z = False
  operation == "MIRROR_Z":
  rror_mod.use_x = False
  rror_mod.use_y = False
  rror mod.use_z = True
  election at the end -add
   ob.select= 1
   er ob.select=1
   ntext.scene.objects.action
   "Selected" + str(modified
   irror ob.select = 0
  bpy.context.selected_obj
   ata.objects[one.name].sel
  int("please select exaction
  --- OPERATOR CLASSES ----
```



The **OSCAL project** is developed openly on GitHub.com



Repository:

https://github.com/usnistgov/OSCAL



Project Website:

https://www.nist.gov/oscal



Contact the team: oscal@nist.gov

ypes.Operator):
 X mirror to the select
ject.mirror_mirror_x"

THANK YOU!